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The phenomenon of adaptive preferences – sometimes also known under the name
of sour grapes – has long caused a stir in Social Theory, mainly because of its impor-
tance in the debate over utilitarianism (Elster, 1983; Sen and Williams, 1982). Among
logicians, notably those in the dynamic logic or belief revision traditions, the ques-
tion of preference change has recently seen a surge of interest (van Benthem and Liu,
2007; Hansson, 1995). However, although the former question seems an instance of
the latter, the theories of preference change proposed to date do not seem to give a
ﬁrm handle on adaptive preferences, and certainly not the sort of deeper understanding
which one might like. In this paper, the precise problem posed by adaptive preferences,
as seen from the point of view of a theoretician who intends to model or understand the
phenomenon, will be clariﬁed, and three models of the phenomenon will be presented
and compared. The general intention of the article is to sound out some of the wider
consequences of the phenomenon for the project of modelling and understanding the
relationship between decisions taken in different situations. Difﬁculties which arise
when several decisions and several situations are involved shall be discussed, and an
approach to these difﬁculties shall be suggested. This approach places particular de-
mands on would-be models of the sour grapes phenomenon; these demands will shed
light on the adequacy of the models proposed.
In the ﬁrst section, we will brieﬂy introduce the phenomenon of sour grapes, and
general notions allowing us to single out some of its important properties. In the second
section, three analyses of sour grapes shall be proposed, each based on a different in-
tuition regarding the phenomenon. In the ﬁnal section, we shall consider the important
problems that the phenomenon poses for theories of beliefs, preferences and decisions,
illustrating the issue with a comparative consideration of the three analyses.
1 What is the phenomenon of sour grapes?
In La Fontaine’s fable, the fox approaches a tree, attempts to reach the grapes, and,
realising that he cannot, turns away, saying to himself that they were sour.
This sort of phenomenon – and we shall be mainly considering this story in this
paper – poses an interesting challenge to models of preferences and of decision. The
problem, in the form in which it is usually posed, involves two acts – one being the
ﬁrst attempt at getting the grapes, the second being the act of walking away – between
which the fox has changed his mind. Note that, by posing the question this way, we are
treating its dynamic version. There is also a counterfactual version of the phenomenon,
where the comparison is not so much between acts in two successive situations, but
between an actual act and a counterfactual act, which the agent would choose in a
counterfactual situation. Sour grapes is involved in the fact that the fox chooses to walk
away in the actual situation, where the grapes are difﬁcult to obtain, although he would
have attempted to grab them had they been easy to obtain (ie. in some counterfactual
situationwheretheywereeasiertoobtain). Althoughthebulkofthispaperwillconcern
the dynamic version, the main points will apply equally to the counterfactual version;
where it is not clear how, this will normally be indicated. The advantage of posing the
problem in a dynamic form is that it involves a real, observable phenomenon, viz. the
fox’sdecisionnottopursuehisattempttoobtainthegrapes. Eventhemostbehaviourist
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perspective on decision making accepts this part of the phenomenon. From this point
on, however, things become rather murky. Here are a number of questions or aspects
about the phenomenon which are particularly relevant.
What has changed? Under the assumption that the agent is minimally rational, in
the sense that he chooses the actions he prefers most, the preferences of differ-
ent available actions (attempting to grasp the grapes, walking away) must have
changed. In the vocabulary of basic decision theory, in which a large portion
of our discussion shall be couched, one would say that his expected utility – the
utility or “proﬁt” or “pleasure” he would expect to obtain from an action given
his beliefs about the state of the world – has changed.1
However, this change is not in itself the interesting factor in the sour grapes phe-
nomenon: expected utility changes are widespread, and often easily dealt with,
for the simple reason that the expected utility can change for two reasons. On
the one hand, such a change can result from a change in the agent’s beliefs about
the state of the world; on the other hand, it could also be a consequence of a
change in the amount of “pleasure” or “proﬁt” the agent would obtain if certain
consequences were realised, or, to put it in decision-theoretic terms, a change in
the agent’s utility.2 It is this latter sort of change that sour grapes is often taken to
involve. Indeed, this interpretation of the phenomenon is necessary for the role
to which it is often put in Social Theory. Utilitarianism relies on the preferences
of the different members of the society; sour grapes or “adaptive preferences” is
taken to show that these preferences may not be sufﬁciently stable, thus weaken-
ing the utilitarianist position, at least as it is traditionally stated.
The difference between utility and expected utility thus turns out to be very im-
portant to the understanding of the sour grapes phenomenon.3 The difference
is usually summed up in the following way: utility is a function on or prop-
erty of the consequences of the agent’s actions, whereas the expected utility is
a function on or property of his actions. However, the important difference for
current purposes is rather the following: utility is pure in so far as the calcula-
tion of the utility of a consequence does not depend on the beliefs of the agent,
whereas expected utility is mixed in so far as the calculation of the expected util-
1The discussion of this paper shall mainly be couched in the terms of classical decision theory, where the
rational agent is taken to maximise expected utilities. More advanced, non expected utility theories, shall not
be considered.
2 Throughout this paper, there will only question of changes in the utility functions, which will be referred
to using the expression change of “utility”, or at times, in order to help readability, “utilities”. Changes in
utility values can be derived from the changes in the utility functions.
3Often, in discussions of preference change, especially among logicians, this distinction is not drawn
(van Benthem and Liu, 2007; Hansson, 1995). In this paper, the theories proposed by such authors shall
be interpreted as theories of utility change rather than expected utility change; this interpretation, although
debatable, at least allows us to consider to what extent these theories can tackle the problem of sour grapes.
Furthermore, such discussions are often couched in terms of preference “update” or “upgrade”. In the lit-
erature on belief change, update is generally considered to involve changes in belief which accommodate
new information regarding changes in the world, whereas “revision” is the name given to changes in belief
to accommodate new information highlighting previous errors (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992). Adaptive
preferences involve changes in the preferences of agents, not changes in the world. For this reason, the
discussion will generally be couched in terms of preference or utility revision or change rather than update.
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ity of a particular action depends, as well as on the utilities of the consequences,
on the agent’s beliefs about the state of the world. If one draws the line so,
then approaches to so-called “utility change” which model “utility” as depend-
ing on beliefs and which account for utility change in terms of changes of beliefs
should be considered as models of expected utility change (or, at least, mixed
utility change), and not of (pure) utility change.4 If the fox turns away, as in La
Fontaine’s version of the fable, saying to himself that the grapes are green, this
can be seen as a change of belief: only his mixed preferences have changed –
the desirability of the grapes depending not only on the general desirability of
grape–properties, but also on his beliefs as to whether these grapes have those
properties – whereas his pure preferences have remained constant – he still en-
joys non-green grapes as before. As noted above, a strong intuition dictates that
sour grapes involves pure as well as mixed utility change (Elster, 1983, p123).
If this intuition is correct, then these models provide inadequate accounts of the
phenomenon.
Why has it changed? Even if one accepts that sour grapes involves (pure) utility
change, it has to be accepted that this utility change is a consequence of some
change in the situation. As Elster (1983, pp121-2) points out, one might draw a
distinction, as to the source of such changes, between those caused by changes in
the world – the “state-dependence” of preferences – and those caused by changes
in the options open – “possibility dependence”.5 Almost immediately he qual-
iﬁes the distinction by noting that, given the possible interdependence of states
and options, and the difﬁculty in getting a clear separation of the two notions, it
may be practically impossible to apply this distinction correctly in practice. One
might expect that a proper account of sour grapes take account of this distinction
and its instability (or, if you prefer, ﬂexibility).
An important point about dependence relations between utilities, states and pos-
sibilities, perhaps not clearly kept in focus in Elster’s discussion, relates to the
diachronic or synchronic nature of the dependence. Decision theorists such as
Karni and Drèze have proposed theories of state-dependent utility – where utility
is not only a function of the consequence, but equally of the state which the act
will “take” to that consequence. This framework is designed to permit a notion
of belief differing, roughly speaking, from the behaviourist notion favoured by
Savage (Karni, 1996). It describes the decision situation at a given instant in
such a way that the utility depends on the states: this is synchronic dependence.
On the other hand, even if the decision situation were such that the utility showed
no dependence on states (at that instant), there could be diachronic dependence,
in so far as the previous states, choices and so on have an inﬂuence on the cur-
rent utility. This seems closer to the sort of dependence that Elster had in mind,
especially given that the notion of possibility-dependence can only really be un-
derstood diachronically,6 as the fact of moving into a situation where only those
4Cyert and DeGroot (1975); de Jongh and Liu (2006) are examples of such models.
5 Given that the deﬁnition of a decision problem incorporates the set of options on offer, the second sort
of change is essentially a change in the decision problem.
6Recall from footnote 5 that a possibility-dependent change corresponds to a change in the decision
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possibilities are on offer.
What is the nature of the change? Elster (1983, Ch III) emphasises that the change
in preferences is of a causal nature, and may not be intentional on the part of
the agent. Whatever the fox’s opinions on the change, it was caused by his
experienceoftheﬁrstattemptatobtainingthegrapes; hedidnotdecidetochange
his preferences in the face of this experience.
How fast and how permanent is the change? Elster (1983, pp112-114) takes pains
to emphasise that the adaption of preferences in situations involving sour grapes
is in principle reversible, after a further change in the situation. In fact, intu-
itions regarding the question of reversibility or permanence of the change differ
depending on the time-scale involved. In general, there are three basic intuitions.
The ﬁrst dictates that the fox does not instantly and immediately change his mind
about the grapes, and so would take them if the possibility arose immediately af-
ter his exclamation that they were no longer desirable. According to such an
intuition, “reversibility” of the purported change is very plausible at moments
close to the situation in question. The second intuition arises from the idea that
it does seem possible, over a longer period of time, and perhaps through force
of habit, for the fox to actually acquire the sort of preferences (regarding the
grapes) he claims to have, so that he would not take the grapes if offered. In-
deed, manypertinent examplesof sour grapes generally involvean extendedtime
spanoverwhichthepreferencesofindividualsseemtochange.7 Aﬁnalintuition,
that which is expressed by Elster, dictates that even this long-term change can
be reversed by a change in situation: given the correct situation, the fox would
once again act in accordance with a preference for grapes.8 A full analysis of
sour grapes should be able to account for these factors. Indeed, the reversibility
aspects seem to suggest that whatever modiﬁed situation the fox ﬁnds himself in
could somehow “lead back to” a situation similar to the initial one. A natural, if
not inevitable, conclusion to draw is that the information regarding the agent’s
previous state is somehow recoverable from his modiﬁed state.
While the counterfactual versions of the previous points are easily derivable from
the discussion above, the counterfactual equivalent of the point about reversibil-
ity and permanence is worth stating explicitly. For the case of immediate re-
versibility (the ﬁrst intuition stated above), it is the following: the fox’s utility
after a failed attempt to get the grapes is not what it would be if the attempt
succeeded. Like the dynamic version, it involves the idea that the information
about other possible situations is recoverable from one particular possible out-
come of his ﬁrst attempt at getting the grapes: the agent’s attitudes in the actual
situation (where he decides not to try again to obtain the grapes) are constituted
in such a way that information regarding certain counterfactual situations (where
problem, and thus is hard to model synchronically, at least without abandoning the traditional decision-
theoretic framework.
7 See, for example, the case of change of preferences for city or countryside life in Elster (1983, p112
sq.).
8 In Elster’s example, someone who moves to the city may acquire a preference for city life, which may
be reversed if he moves back to the countryside for a considerable period.
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the grapes are easier to obtain) is, at least partially, recoverable. There is no natu-
ral counterfactual analogy for the long-term “endurance” of the purported utility
change (second intuition); the counterfactual version of the long-term reversibil-
ity (third intuition) is basically the same as that stated above.
These considerations indicate the importance of the phenomenon of sour grapes for
decision theory. Sour grapes poses the problem of the identity, stability and variability
of the central notions of decision theory – utility, belief, expected utility. The basic
question of sour grapes is: what changes? Beyond the preferences on actions (expected
utilities), is there a change in the preferences on consequences (“pure” utilities), or just
a change in beliefs?
In Section 2, three analyses – or, more accurately, analyses schema – for the phe-
nomenon of sour grapes shall be proposed. For each analysis, the extent to which it
accounts for the points made above shall be discussed; this counts as a preliminary test
of the analyses, which may be used to compare them. However, in the Section 3, it will
emerge that the general question posed by sour grapes can be approached in two ways,
and that, although the analyses are all consistent with both conceptions of the question,
the suitability of the analyses will depend on the precise task which they are supposed
to fulﬁl. One of the approaches to the problem shall be defended against the other, and
the analyses shall be judged according to their ability to fulﬁl the tasks demanded by
this approach. Before embarking on the presentation of the models of sour grapes, a
few preliminary methodological remarks are in order.
Methodological preliminaries As has been suggested by the discussion so far, the
basic framework of Savage-style decision theory shall be assumed here (Savage, 1954).
A decision problem consists of a set of states of the world, a set of possible conse-
quences, and a set of acts, considered to be functions taking each state of the world
to a consequence. The agent’s beliefs are represented by a probability function on the
states of the world, his utility (or desirability) of consequences are represented by a
utility function (assigning to each consequence a real number, considered to be its util-
ity value). His preferences over acts are thus represented by his expected utility – the
sum of the utilities of the consequences of the acts weighted by the probabilities of the
states which would yield that consequence – in the sense that he agent prefers an act
to another if and only if the expected utility of the ﬁrst exceeds that of the second.9
This choice of framework is not intended to imply any particular commitment to this
fashion of theorising; rather, its purpose is to clarify the discussion.
Two properties of the traditional Savage framework should are to be noted. Firstly,
it applies synchronically: to a particular decision problem, at a particular moment. Sec-
ondly, it involves state-independent utilities, that is, utilities which are functions solely
of the consequences of actions. Since Savage’s original work, many have found reason
to weaken this supposition on utilities. Indeed, authors such as Drèze and Karni have
9One of the issues that will emerge in the ﬁnal section of the paper is how one comes to ﬁx the beliefs and
utilities of the fox before and after his attempt at obtaining the grapes. For the purposes of the presentation
of the analyses in Section 2, it may be assumed that the beliefs and utilities in question are unique (and, if
one likes, that they have been elicited uniquely, with the aid of whatever representation theorem one prefers);
extended discussion will be reserved for Section 3.
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developed decision theories which resemble that of Savage, except that the utilities are
state-dependent: they are functions both of the consequence of the action and of the
state which the action “takes” to that consequence.10 As noted above, these decision
theories remain synchronic, in the sense that they apply to a particular decision prob-
lem at a given moment. However, they may be seen as more general than Savage’s
original framework, not only in so far as the state-independence of utility is considered
by some to be doubtful, but in the sense that state-independent utilities can be seen as a
special case of state-dependent utilities (where the dependence is effectively null). For
this reason, the analyses proposed in the following section will be presented in their
state-dependent version: the utility functions will take as arguments states as well as
consequences.11
Finally, let us emphasise the importance of the distinction between the point of
view of the modelee – the agent – from that of the modeler – the decision theorist.
For example, the fact that the modeler elicits certain probability and utility functions
representing the beliefs and utilities of the agent does not imply that the agent him-
self will recognise these as his beliefs or utilities. Indeed, the division of aspects into
those of which the modelee is conscious and those which are transparent only to the
modeler can be made with respect to different aspects of the model, and indeed yield
different interpretations of the same model.12 So, for example, a common intuition
regarding sour grapes, which shall be exploited below, states that the agent does not
really change his utilities, he only represents the situation to himself in this way. Such
an interpretation obviously relies on the distinction between the agent’s representation
of his mental states and the modeler’s.
2 Three analyses
This section contains three analyses – or, to the extent that they require leave precisely
speciﬁed blanks to be ﬁlled by particular mechanisms, three analysis schema – for sour
grapes. Throughout the section, S shall be the set of pertinent states of the world,
where in each state factors such as the position of the grapes and the height of the tree,
are determined. C shall be the set of consequences, and shall contain two elements –
obtaining the grapes or not obtaining the grapes. The sour grape story involves two
situations: the situation before the fox’s ﬁrst attempt at getting the grapes (which shall
be called “the ﬁrst situation”); the situation after this attempt, and in which he takes his
decision to try again or to give in (the “second situation”).
10See, for example, Karni et al. (1983); Karni and Mongin (2000); Drèze (1987).
11 A disadvantage of this generality is the difﬁculty in comparing utilities involved in decision problems
which do not share the same set of states of the world. This shall become an important consideration in
Section 3; for the rest of the discussion, this complication shall be put to one side (situations will be assumed
to have states of world which are sufﬁciently similar to allow comparisons of utilities).
12There may be philosophical difﬁculties with this distinction. However, it is necessary to make it where
possible for methodological reasons: to avoid confusions regarding the interpretation of the model. In prac-
tice, it shall not be difﬁcult to draw the distinction where necessary for the purposes of the following discus-
sion.
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2.1 Pure utility change
The simplest analysis of sour grapes takes it at face value: the difference between the
two situations is indeed a change in (pure) utilities. In such a model the modeler and the
agent (the fox) agree that the fox’s utility function is different in the second situation,
with respect to the ﬁrst, and this explainshis decision not to pursue his attempt to obtain
the grapes.
Writing this formally, let the initial preferences of the fox be determined
by probability p1 and utility u1, so that the expected utility of an action f is P
s2S p1(s)u1(s;f(s)). Then, according to this model, the probability in the second
situation will also be p1, but the utility will now be u2. The preferences of the fox
(over actions) will thus be represented by
P
s2S p1(s)u2(s;f(s)). A full model results
when one adds an account of the change from u1 to u2; one might expect theories of
preference change for example to provide such accounts.
Let us consider how this form of analysis fares with respect to the points raised
in Section 1. Concerning the question of what has changed, it is the (pure) utility
which is taken to change in this situation. Indeed, the interpretation of this situa-
tion as a utility change is unavoidable, unless certain special conditions are satisﬁed.
That is to say, one could not even rewrite the representation in the second situation P
s2S p1(s)u2(s;f(s)) as if it consisted in a change of belief with a ﬁxed utility (ie.
in the form
P
s2S p0(s)u1(s;f(s))), unless there was a particular relationship between
the two utilities: namely, u2(s;c) = p00(s):u2(s;c), where p00 is a function on states
satisfying the ordinary axioms for probability. Given that this is a rather special case,
one can justiﬁably say that this is essentially a model under which sour grapes really
involves a change in utility.
Consider the question of the source of the change (state- or possibility-dependent).
Under this analysis, the same possibilities (actions) are available in the ﬁrst and the
second situation, so the change cannot be thought of as possibility-dependent. Indeed,
most of the current theories of preference change keep the same options (ie. possibili-
ties) but alter the preferences on them;13 to this extent, they could only be understood
in terms of state-dependent change. As such, there is a general failure to account for
the tight relationship between state- and possibility-dependent change. Furthermore,
for current theories of preference change, even the interpretation as state-dependent
change is not immediate. These theories usually consider changes in the face of state-
ments specifying particular preference relations to be accepted,14 and it is not trivial to
translate the changes in the world – the fox’s experience of his ﬁrst attempt at getting
the grapes, say – in terms of such statements. Indeed, these theories seem at best to
be modelling intentional preference change, as witnessed by the motivation they draw
from models of apparently intentional processes (learning from observation, accepting
an announcement). This is at odds with the nature of the change involved in sour grapes
and noted in Section 1: the fox’s experience causes the change, he does not decide to
13Cyert and DeGroot (1975); van Benthem and Liu (2007) and the revision and contraction operations in
Hansson (1995) are some examples.
14In Hansson (1995), the agent “learns” that a certain outcome has a certain desirability, and alters his
preferences accordingly; in van Benthem and Liu (2007), an agent is told to prefer a certain outcome, and
alters his preferences accordingly.
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change his utility after the experience. If a theory of preference change is to be had
which completes the basic framework in such a way as to account for the aspects noted
in Section 1, more work is required.
Furthermore, such a completed model would equally have to deal with the re-
versibility and permanence properties of sour grapes, an aspect on which the analysis,
at least primae facie, does not fair well. On the positive side, this analysis does account
the instance where the subject actually acquires the utility in the long term, modelling
it as a straight utility change. However, the modalities of the change seem to have been
reversed: an adaption of the utility over a long period is captured here by a sudden revi-
sion at a particular moment. Furthermore, it is not certain that the analysis can account
for the short- or long-term reversibility of the change, because there is no guarantee that
the utility change it proposes is reversible. Indeed, most models of preference change,
based as they are on models of belief revision or public announcement, do not allow
one to recover the original preferences: like the models they are based on, the previous
preferences, and thus other possible preference revisions, are lost when a revision is
performed. The reversibility and permanence phenomena thus pose a supplementary
challenge for anyone seeking to take up and defend this analysis, which does not seem
to have been satisfactorily met by current models of preference change.
This ﬁrst analysis of sour grapes is ﬁrmly embedded in an as yet not fully developed
theory of utility change. At this stage, all that can be noted is the inadequacies of the
current models of utility change, and the difﬁculties which an eventual model should
overcome. Yet, even under this meagre construal, some may already ﬁnd the analysis
inadequate. All that theorisation of utility change would bring is a theorisation of the
particular utility changes occurring in sour grapes. However, it would not explain the
particularities of the phenomena, such as the intuition that the fox’s utilities do not
really change, at least not immediately after his failed attempt at getting the grapes.
The second model takes this as its guiding intuition.
2.2 Self-justiﬁcation
An important intuition about the sour grapes phenomenon, brieﬂy mentioned in Sec-
tion 1, is that it does not effect so much the action of the agent (at the moment of the
sour grapes phenomenon), but the way he justiﬁes or rationalises the action (to or for
himself). The fox walks away from the grapes in any case; it is the reason he gives
himself for walking away that is at issue. Under this interpretation of the phenomenon,
although it does not (directly) effect concurrent behaviour, the rationalisation he con-
structs for himself will effect the utilities and the beliefs he sees himself as having.
One would thus want an internal model, representing the utilities and the beliefs
the fox sees himself as having; this will differ from the representation that an external
observer would make of the situation. For someone inclined to think of sour grapes as
simple self-justiﬁcation, the change in the expected utility is properly thought of as a
revision of beliefs with information learnt during the ﬁrst attempt at getting the grapes:
he learns that the grapes are more difﬁcult to obtain than previously thought. However,
according to such an analysis of sour grapes, the fox represents the change to himself
as a change in his preferences for the grapes; that is, as a change of utilities.
As in the previous example, let the initial preferences of the fox be determined
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by probability p1 and utility u1, so that the expected utility of an action f is P
s2S p1(s)u1(s;f(s)). Furthermore, assume that p1(s) 6= 0 for all s: this assumption
captures the fact that the fox does not have any preconceptions about the position of the
grapes and the like. It is supposed that the modeler and the fox agree on the fox’s prob-
ability and utility functions: that is, they represent the fox’s state in the ﬁrst situation,
both for the fox and for the modeler. The modeler and the fox will disagree however
on the representation of the fox’s state after his attempt at getting the grapes. For the
modeler, the effect of the ﬁrst attempt can be represented as a change of probability to
a new function p2: thinking of it this way, the fox learns from his ﬁrst attempt (that it
is more difﬁcult than he thought to get the grapes). The change from p1 to p2 can be
modelled by whatever belief change mechanism one prefers, and different mechanisms
will lead to different “completions” of this analysis. After the change, the fox’s ex-
pected utility thus becomes
P
s2S p2(s)u1(s;f(s)). However, as opposed to the case
of the previous analysis, it is always possible to rewrite the expected utility formula as
if there was a change in the utility and not in the probability. One obtains the represen-
tation by
P
s2S p1(s)u2(s;f(s)), where u2(s;c) =
p2(s)
p1(s)u1(s;c).15 This is the sort of
change that the fox sees himself as making: he has not learnt that the grapes are harder
to obtain, he has just changed his mind about whether he wants them or not.
Let us consider how this analysis fares with respect to the points raised in Sec-
tion 1. Concerning the question of what has changed, the point of view taken on the
situation is crucial. All are agreed that the expected utility (preferences on acts) has
altered; however, whereas the theorist’s representation traces the change to a change
in beliefs, the fox represents the change to himself as stemming from an alteration in
his utilities. Under this analysis, sour grapes does not pose a speciﬁc problem for the
modeler: it can be modelled with ordinary belief change apparatus. Sour grapes is
merely a phenomenon of self-justiﬁcation, and, at this stage at least, only a change in
the representation of one’s own preferences.
Turning to the properties and the source of the change, there are two aspects (from
the modeler’s point of view): ﬁrstly, the experience of the ﬁrst attempt at obtaining the
grapescausingachangeinbeliefs, andsecondly, areluctancetorecognisethechangein
expected utility as ensuing from a change in beliefs. Given that neither of these factors
are intentional in themselves (the ﬁrst attempt is intentional, its result, and the belief
change caused, is not), the change comes out as causal rather than intentional. How-
ever, as in the analysis presented above, some belief change mechanisms may not be
applicable in this case if they cannot be interpreted as modelling “unintentional” belief
change. The role of the ﬁrst attempt – which, in the second situation, can be considered
as a state of the world (the world has the property that the ﬁrst attempt was a failure) –
indicates that there is diachronic state-dependence, rather than possibility-dependence.
Indeed, the fact that the same states and consequences are involved, and thus the same
actions are on offer, in the ﬁrst and second situations, implies that this analysis can-
not account for the cases where sour grapes is caused by possibility-dependence, nor
for the subtle relationship between state- and possibility-dependence. The diachronic
dependence is understood in so far as the belief change mechanism employed yields
an understanding of the effect of the fox’s negative experience at obtaining the grapes
15This is well-deﬁned since p1(s) 6= 0 for all s.
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on his subsequent beliefs. Furthermore, the diachronic state-dependence has a syn-
chronic counterpart, in the fox’s rationalisation: the sort of state-dependence of the
utility in the ﬁrst situation (ie. in the utility u1) necessarily differs from the state-
dependence in the second situation (ie. in u2). This difference is particularly clear in
the case where the former utility is state-independent: the latter utility will nevertheless
be state-dependent, which attests to a form of synchronic state-dependence in the wake
of the ﬁrst attempt at getting the grapes. From the fox’s point of view, the synchronic
state-dependence in the second situation is an admission that, had the grapes been more
easy to get to, they would be more desirable. Depending on whether one considers that
the fox has changed his preferences regarding the grapes in general, or only his prefer-
ences regarding grapes which require a certain effort to obtain, one might count this as
more or less of a weakness of this analysis.
Finally, regarding the reversibility and permanence properties of the sour grapes
phenomenon, this analysis does not necessarily fair too well. The probability changes
are not in general reversible; indeed, most belief change mechanisms are irreversible.
It may thus not be possible to recover the original utility from the new utility the fox
thinks of himself as having. However, the fact that the utility has not changed, under
the modeler’s account of the scenario, may go a fair way to explaining why the fox
would accept the grapes if offered immediately. In this sense, the model may be able
to account for short-term reversibility. On the other hand, the entire dependence on a
change in belief does not seem to explain the apparent endurance of a utility change
over long time periods, which was noted in Section 1. Similarly, the phenomenon of
long-term reversibility (reversibility after an enduring utility change) seems difﬁcult to
account for only in terms of belief change.
This analysis perhaps fairs better than the previous one – for one thing, there is a
larger amount of work on belief revision to draw upon – but it still has trouble account-
ing for some of the subtler properties noted in Section 1. Moreover, there are several
other aspects of the model which may count as unsettling. There is a certain intuition
according to which there is no belief change involved in sour grapes phenomena. The
fox knew the position of the grapes, the height of the bush and similar information
before his ﬁrst attempt: so what has he learnt? The natural answer seems to be that
he learnt the chances of success at obtaining the grapes, given that they are at such a
height. As is infamous in the domain, distinctions of beliefs from other aspects depend
on the way decision problems are set up: in the current case, the states of the world per-
tain entirely to the situation of the grapes (and, perhaps, physical facts about the fox),
and no information on these issues is apparently learnt in his ﬁrst attempt at obtaining
the grapes. The chances of him succeeding correspond rather to the chances that the
acts on offer (which are, technically, functions from states to consequences) reliably
effectuate the transitions from state to consequence which they claim to. This is the
guiding intuition for the third analysis.
2.3 Reliability of acts
Under the ﬁnal approach to the phenomenon of sour grapes, the fox does not learn
anything about the states of nature, nor does he alter his utility on consequences, but he
does change his opinion about the reliability – or if you prefer, the chances of success
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– of the acts on offer. This change can be absorbed into the utility function and thus be
interpreted as a change in it; on the other hand, it may be left explicit, where it receives
a natural interpretation.
As in the previous analyses, let p1 and u1 be the probability and utility of the fox
before his ﬁrst attempt at obtaining the grapes, so that his preferences in the ﬁrst situa-
tion are represented by
P
s2S p1(s):u1(s;f(s)). As a result of his attempt at obtaining
the grapes, the probability and utility functions do not change, but he places a (non-
trivial) reliability measure, °, on the pairs (s;c) (s 2 S;c 2 C). For an act purporting
to send s to c, °(s;c) measures the chances of success of the act, when the state of the
world is s.16 Despite the vocabulary used, there seems little reason why ° should be a
probability measure, although, assuming the ordinary boundedness assumptions, it can
be normalised so as to take values between 0 and 1 (0 meaning that the act will certainly
fail, 1thatitwillcertainlysucceed). Therepresentationoftheposteriorpreferencerela-
tion (in the second situation) will thus be given by
P
s2S p1(s):°(s;f(s)):u1(s;f(s)).
Regarding the questions posed in Section 1, note ﬁrstly that, like the ﬁrst analysis
(Section 2.1), it is not always possible to reformulate the change in his preferences as
if it consisted in a change in belief.17 However, it is always possible to reformulate it
as if it were a utility change: °(s;c):u1(s;c) may be thought of as a utility function. In
this sense, the experience can be thought of as causing a change in the utility function
to °(s;c):u1(s;c); what is more, ° characterises exactly this change. Evidently, it is
not necessary to see this as a utility change, because °(s;c)):u1(s;c) is not the only
utility involved in second situation: there is still the initial utility u1. u1 is, so to speak,
the pure utility, independent of the situation,18 whereas °(s;c):u1(s;c) is the utility in
this situation – relative to the situation in so far as the situation limits, through °, the
accessibility of c, or the chances of actually obtaining this consequence. Many of the
attractive properties of the analysis come from the availability of these two utilities.
The ﬁrst of these properties has already been evoked: in this analysis, sour grapes
comes out as a change in the situation-indexed utility, though not in the pure utility.
Indeed, the interpretations of these two utilities depend on the view one has of the
agent. If the agent is considered to be conscious of the aspects of the model, then he is
perfectly lucid about the inﬂuences on his preferences over acts which arise from his
utilities, and those inﬂuences which arise from the chances of success of the different
acts offered. When the fox mumbles that the grapes are no longer desired, his afﬁrma-
tion is only true – and only meant – in the context of the current situation, since it refers
to the situation-dependent utility rather than any more stable or transcendental utility.
However, if the model is seen as only that of the modeler, the fox may not be so clear
about the difference between the two utilities. This confusion has consequences for the
appropriateness of the model, and notably the distinction between the two utilities. He
might consider a utility change to have occurred, whereas the “underlying” utility (the
16For the purposes of questions regarding uniqueness and representation theorems, ° may be taken to
be a technical translation function which engineers would reveal by experiment (for example, by offering
appropriate bets on the success of acts).
17This will only be possible in the degenerate case where ° is independent of its second value c, and where
it is a probability measure on S.
18Recall footnote 11: complexities regarding situations which do not share the same states of the world
are left aside here.
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u1 retained by the modeler) has not actually changed.
This duality of utilities has consequences for the question of whether the change is
to be considered as state- or possibility-dependent: it allows the analysis to be faithful
to the ﬂexibility of this distinction, noted in Section 1, and left unaccounted for by the
previous two analyses. On the one hand, the change between the two situations (before
and after his attempt at obtaining the grapes) can be considered as a change of state (to
a state where he has had the experience of his attempt) as in the previous two cases;
thereisdiachronicstatedependence. Ontheotherhand, thefunction° representslimits
on the range of actions he can expect to carry out successfully; in other word, it limits
on the possibilities effectively available to the fox in second situation. In this sense,
there is diachronic possibility dependence: the experience of the ﬁrst attempt causes
the introduction of the factor °, which can be thought of as restricting possibilities.
Moreover, this diachronic subtlety is reproduced on the synchronic level. On the one
hand, there is possibility dependence if one considers the agent as keeping his utility
u1, but having his range of actions restricted by the reliability function °. On the other
hand, thereisstatedependenceifonetakeshissituation-indexedutility°(s;c):u1(s;c),
in so far as this utility has a different dependence on states from the utility in the ﬁrst
situation (u1).
Furthermore, the duality of the two utilities, and their different behaviour across
situations, may help to account for the reversibility and permanence phenomena.
°(s;c):u1(s;c) is the utility in the second situation, but u1, the pure utility, is still
conserved as a separate term, which may be extracted, used and discussed. For ex-
ample, the immediate reversal of preferences may be understood as reverting back to
the pure utility u1; this can equally be considered as a change in ° (corresponding to
the shift to another situation). Here, the fact that the pure utility u1 remains constant
between situations, whereas the situation- or context-dependent parameter ° varies,
is exploited; indeed, in many cases, the relationship between the second situation and
other situations may be understood in this way. On the other hand, the fact that the anal-
ysis offers another utility, the agent’s situation-dependent utility °(s;c):u1(s;c), which
the fox may mistake for his utility proper, may be able to play a role in understanding
long-term utility change. If the agent remains for an extended period with a generally
similar set of acts, and a similar reliability measure on these acts, this utility will con-
tinue to apply (the same factor ° applies to these acts), and eventually, as he comes to
presuppose that these are the only acts on offer, and that they have these chances of
success, this utility will completely usurp the pure utility u1. Long-term reversal of
preferences could be understood in terms of a situation change which is drastic enough
to invalidate this presupposition, by introducing new acts or by changing the reliability
measure °, in such a way that resort to the pure utility is once again required.19 Under
this account, long-term reversibility is a similar sort of effect to short-term reversibility,
though of differing degree.
Just as for the other analyses, this is more a sketch than a fully developed analy-
sis. A full analysis would require an account of the appearance and dynamics of the
factor °. Such an account should make clear its dependence on the result of the fox’s
19Indeed, in Elster’s example of long-term reversibility (of the preference for city life; see footnotes 7 and
8), a drastic change is required (a move to the countryside for a considerable period).
13c °Brian Hill Three Analyses of Sour Grapes
ﬁrst attempt at getting the grapes (the causal aspect of the change20), as well as, more
generally, the relationship between the functions ° in different situations (related to the
reversibility), and an account of the possible absorption of ° into the agent’s utility over
time (related to the long-term permanence of the change). However, the introduction
of ° permits two notions of utility which, to a certain point, reconcile the intuitions that
the utility changes, that it has not “really” changed at the moment when the fox walks
away, but that, over time, it may really change. Indeed, the duality of utilities allows
the analysis to take account, in a way the previous analyses do not, of the subtler as-
pectsof thesour grapesphenomenon, such asthe ﬂexibledistinction betweenstate- and
possibility-dependence, and the question of reversibility and permanence. The price to
pay, if it even seen as such, is the introduction of a factor ° and a representation of
preferences which, to the knowledge of the author, has not appeared previously in the
literature.
3 Getting your teeth into sour grapes
Three possible analyses – or rather, analysis schemas – of the phenomenon of sour
grapes have been presented; for each, their abilities to account for the properties of the
phenomenon noted in Section 1 have been discussed. One might attempt to decide be-
tween these analyses on the basis of their performance with respect to these properties.
A more thorough comparison, however, would only be possible if it were made clear
what exactly is expected of a model or analysis of sour grapes. In this concluding sec-
tion, it is the general question of what one expects in general from a model of dynamic
phenomenon, such as sour grapes, which will be at issue. Two strategies for dealing
with such phenomena will be considered, which conceptualise the problem in different
ways, and demand different things from analyses of the phenomenon.
As noted in the introduction, the basic question of sour grapes is determining what
changes: beliefs or utilities.21 This involves two sorts of problems. One is the problem
of distinguishing the agent’s beliefs from his utilities in a given situation or decision
problem. The other is the problem of studying the relationship between his beliefs
and utilities in different situations (be they subsequent or counterfactual). Much work
has been dedicated to the ﬁrst problem taken in isolation from the second, and indeed
on the second – at least for the case of belief change – taken in isolation from the
ﬁrst. However, given that both problems are central to sour grapes, the challenge is to
account for both of them. A model of sour grapes should permit a distinction between
the agent’s beliefs and his utilities in a given situation and deliver an understanding of
their behaviour in time or under changes of situations. Only such a model would be
able to say something about what changes are actually involved in the phenomenon of
sour grapes.
There are two strategies for dealing with this pair of problems. One strategy, the
20Under this analysis, the change is of a causal nature, brought about by the fox’s experience of his ﬁrst
attempt at obtaining the grapes. As in the previous cases, the fact that it is not necessarily intentional may
place restrictions on the form of the theory of ° which would complete this analysis.
21There could be a change in both: this would correspond to a certain mix of some of the analyses given
above, and not treated separately here.
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mostcommon, proceedsbyﬁrstsoundingoutthebeliefsandutilitiesineach, individual
situation, independently of other situations, and then treating the question of how the
beliefs and utilities have changed from one situation to the next. An alternative strategy
considers such a factorisation impracticable or undesirable, and so allows the decision
about the beliefs and utilities in a particular situation to depend on other (counterfac-
tual or subsequent) situations. It deals with the problem of distinguishing beliefs and
utilities in a given situation and that of understanding their changes between situations
simultaneously, in such a way that the conclusions relative to one make reference to
observations regarding the other.
Note that, at least in the dynamic version (as opposed to the counterfactual one),
the second strategy is as behaviourist as the ﬁrst. It still refers solely to the actions of
the agent (and his preferences over possible actions), although the actions involved are
spread out over a larger time-scale. Furthermore, the analyses proposed in the Section
2 and the points made about them do not depend on the adoption of one strategy or the
other. Indeed, they can be understood equally well, albeit slightly differently, under
both strategies. If the former strategy is preferred, then one will suppose that, given
appropriate conditions, a unique representation in terms of beliefs and utilities can be
obtained:22 it is the changes in these beliefs which the analyses purport to capture. On
the other hand, if the latter strategy is assumed, then the analyses present the structure
of the changes of beliefs and utilities, without the supposition that these beliefs and
utilities can be provided separately from the question of the changes they undergo from
one situation to another. Although all the analyses are compatible with both strategies,
it may nevertheless turn out that some of the analyses are better suited to the demands
of a particular strategy than others.
In this ﬁnal section, we will mainly be concerned with the second strategy: if any
phenomenon can argue for the second strategy over the ﬁrst, sour grapes, as a dynamic
phenomenon involving precisely the question of the distinction between beliefs and
utilities, can. Several disadvantages of the ﬁrst strategy shall be raised. These will
suggest that the second approach is primae facie legitimate. The article will close with
several remarks about how it could be applied, and a discussion of the consequences of
adopting this strategy for the adequacy of the preceding analyses.
3.1 The common strategy
The ﬁrst proposed strategy consists in eliciting the beliefs and utilities of the fox be-
fore his ﬁrst attempt at obtaining the grapes and his beliefs and utilities after this at-
tempt separately, by making reference only to the respective situations. Under this
perspective, the analyses proposed above can be empirically tested, in so far as it can
be checked whether the behaviour of the beliefs and utilities are as described by a par-
ticular analysis. For such a strategy to be viable, there needs to be a way of sounding a
unique set of beliefs and utilities for the agent (a unique pair of probability and utility
functions) in each situation: without sufﬁcient uniqueness, no non trivial answer can
be given to the question of what has changed. To do this, one generally employs the so-
22As discussed below, this will normally be done with representation theorems. Given that it is not the
purpose of this paper is to discuss the technical details, we omit the relevant axiomatisations and theorems.
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called representation theorems of decision theory. Potential weaknesses in this strategy
arise, ﬁrstly, from the conditions under which beliefs and utilities can be (uniquely)
speciﬁed in a given situation using representation theorems, and secondly, from the
consequences of the strategy of eliciting beliefs and utilities whilst totally ignoring
their dynamics.
Representationtheoremsgenerallyworkbyposingasetofconditionsontheagent’s
preference relation over acts such that, if these are satisﬁed, the preference relation is
represented by a probability function and a utility function which satisfy certain prop-
erties, and are unique in an appropriate sense. The most famous example is doubtless
that of Savage (1954), which, for a preference relation satisfying certain properties, de-
livers a unique probability function and an effectively unique state-independent utility
function23 representing the agent’s preferences. Karni, Drèze and others have proposed
conditions which guarantee more or less unique probability and state-dependent utility
functions.24 However, as has been pointed out often, many of the conditions demanded
on the preference relation do not seem to apply in actual decision situations. It is not
the place to enter into these debates, but only to note that certain of the conditions are
particularly unsuitable when emphasis is being placed on decision problems posed in
particular situations; such is the case when the change in attitudes between situations
is at issue. The “structural axioms” of decision theory,25 such as Savage’s P6, demand
that the decision situation contain an inﬁnite number of states and that the agent’s pref-
erences be ﬁne enough to distinguish between acts which differ only by their effects
on a small fraction of these states.26 For real situations, this obviously does not ap-
ply; however, normal responses to this observation, which often involve a recourse to
some global situation,27 are not appropriate in the current discussion, since they do not
necessarily preserve the dynamic aspects which are at issue here.
The other general objection to the strategy of determining the probability and util-
ity functions in the various situations before studying the (dynamical or counterfac-
tual) relationships between them raises the worry that these relationships may become
incomprehensible under this approach. As Karni notes in his critical discussion of
Savage’s method for eliciting beliefs (1996, p256-7), the beliefs elicited using repre-
sentation theorems such as Savage’s in a particular situation is at odds with the agent’s
behaviour in related situations.28 Supposing that Savage’s theorem is applicable in
these other situations, this objection would seem to suggest that there is no comprehen-
sible relationship between the beliefs and utilities elicited by means of the theorem in
the two situations. This conﬂicts with the intuition that the two situations are strongly
23Namely, it is unique up to afﬁne increasing transformation. Such subtleties may be ignored for current
purposes.
24See the references in footnote 10.
25As Suppes (1984) calls them.
26Theorists who deviate from Savage’s framework generally require equally strong assumptions: for ex-
ample, the framework proposed by Anscombe and Aumann (1963), and adopted by Karni and Mongin
(2000), consists a ﬁnite sets of states, but an inﬁnite (and structured) set of consequences.
27Savage (1954, p83): “a person has only one decision to make in his whole lifetime. He must, namely,
decide how to live, and this he might in principle do once and for all.”
28Karni considers Aumann’s example of the husband betting on his wife’s operation (see Drèze (1987,
p77)), and in particular the continuation where he advises a friend on a similar bet: the point is that the
husband’s advice conﬂicts with the bet he has made.
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connected. With such representation theorems, one gains a unique representation of the
beliefs and utilities, at the price of even the most basic understanding of how the be-
liefs and utilities in different situations are related. Karni’s objection seems to point to
a general criterion for representation theorems: they should not only yield synchronic
or instantaneous representations of preferences in terms of beliefs and utilities (ie. in
terms of a probability and a utility function), but they should furnish representations
which aid in the understanding of cross-situational (dynamic or counterfactual) phe-
nomena involving beliefs and utilities. This requirement on representation theorems is
well-motivated: there is little point distinguishing the beliefs and utilities of an agent
involved in a single decision in a particular situation, if one is not also interested in the
relationship with the beliefs and utilities involved in other decisions in other situations.
For want of a better name, let us call this the dynamic requirement.
Although a range of different representation theorems have been proposed (each
proposing a different pair of probability and utility functions), it is still unclear which
of them deliver the probability and utility functions which are the most fruitful for un-
derstanding the behaviour in related situations. Indeed, such theorems are not designed
with the dynamic requirement in mind, and, in discussions of the theorems, little atten-
tion is paid to whether the representations can account for such relationships. This is
a second reason for avoiding the use of traditional representation theorems, and more
generally the strategy which employs them, in the approach to sour grapes.
3.2 An alternative strategy
The second approach to phenomena such as sour grapes deals with the question of dis-
tinguishing beliefs and utilities in particular situations and the question of their changes
simultaneously. In judging what the beliefs and utilities of the agent are in a particular
situation at a particular moment, it is permitted, if not necessary, to look at his actions,
and perhaps beliefs and utilities, in other situations at other moments (or in other coun-
terfactual situations). Such an approach is certainly not without intuitive support, at
least for the phenomenon of sour grapes under discussion here. Indeed, this approach
is faithful to the adage that, to see whether the fox has really changed his mind about
the desirability of the grapes, one needs to see how he acts in other situations where
they are more accessible (if they were offered on a plate for example, or if, just after
turning away, he spots a ladder). The approach to the problem discussed above ignores
this intuition, in so far as it claims to elicit the fox’s beliefs and utilities solely on the
basis of his preferences in the situation where he chooses to walk away. Indeed, as
noted above, that strategy will generally fail to account for intuitions, such as this one,
which involve other situations.
By posing the question of the relationship between situations at the same time as
that of the beliefs and utilities involved in a given situation, the second strategy takes
full heed of the dynamic requirement stated above. Indeed, the task now becomes that
of specifying a unique set of beliefs and utilities (probability and utility functions) in
each situation in such a way that, not only they represent the preferences of the agent in
the appropriate situation, but equally they permit an understanding of the relationship
betweentheagent’spreferencesinsuitablyrelatedsituations. Thesortofunderstanding
required in the last clause remains to be made precise, and probably can only be done
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so as different sorts of relations are proposed and debated.
This is a reformulation both of the problem of distinguishing beliefs and utilities in
a given situation and of the problem of sour grapes, which involves the supplementary
question of the change in beliefs and utilities. The fruitfulness of this reformulation,
and the possibility of successfully tackling these problems by posing them in these
terms, involves three factors or suppositions. The ﬁrst is that the data available cannot
be restricted to the situation or situations of direct interest (the situation where the
beliefs and utilities are to be elicited; the two situations involved in sour grapes). The
second is that there must be some situations where it is relatively easy to elicit beliefs
and utilities. The third is that there is a general consistency in the relationship between
situations. Let us consider these points one at a time, focussing in particular on the
example of the fox’s sour grapes.
As noted above, sour grape phenomena generally involve the comparison between
two distinct situations. Although the state of the agent (and thus of the world) may dif-
fer between the two situations, the general aspects of the decision problem which relate
to the preferences at issue do not. So, for example, although between the situations be-
fore and after the fox’s ﬁrst attempt something has changed, the states of the world and
consequences (respectively, relating to the position of the grapes and whether or not he
obtains them) have not changed and so neither have the acts on offer. Accepting the
dynamic requirement, and its demand that the elicitation of belief and utility in a situ-
ation should involve appeals to other situations, this pair of situations does not seem to
sufﬁce as data for the task of identifying the beliefs and utilities involved in each. In-
deed, identifying the beliefs and utilities in each situation in a way which depends only
on the other situation, to then use these in the consideration of the relationship between
the beliefs and utilities in the two situations, seems ﬂatly circular. It is thus natural to
bring a third situation into the fray.29 The data in the sour grape problem is not limited
to the two situations involved, but to other, appropriately related situations.30
The evident question that now arises, and this is the second point to be made about
this sort of approach, is that of the nature of this supplementary situation. A situation
which shares the general aspects of the decision problem (sets of states of the world,
sets of consequences, and thus acts on offer) with the two original situations, though
perhaps differing in utility or belief, would be of only marginal help. This is because
the same sort of complicated question of belief and utility change between this third
situation and the two original ones would arise again, and it is not clear if it would be
any easier to resolve. This would seem to argue for a third decision situation which
differs more radically from the original two: namely, one which either does not share
their set of states of the world or their set of consequences, and thus, does not offer the
same acts.31 The interest of this decoupling of consequences and states of the world is
29In general, more than one supplementary situation will be required, but only one shall be considered for
the sake of this discussion.
30This is not the ﬁrst time that people have suggested relying on other situations in the elicitation of beliefs
and utilities, although the strategy has not always been formulated in such explicit terms. Karni and Mongin
(2000) use “hypothetical objects of choice”, which (putting aside complications regarding conditionals) are
the acts which the agent would choose in a situation where a certain condition was realised (he chooses to
go out, if it does not rain, ie. in the situation where it does not rain). More recently Karni (2006) refers to the
agent’s preferences after Bayesian update (ie. in a subsequent situation), in his elicitation of beliefs.
31The existence of such a third situation depends on the fact that the two original situations are not global.
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that there follows a decoupling of beliefs and utilities. Consider a third situation which
shares, say, the same consequences as the ﬁrst two, but with acts which operate on a
different set of states of the world: the beliefs in the previous two situations are no
longer relevant in this third situation. This should aid the comparison of the utilities
between the situations, and notably, show whether they really changed. If the fox were
offered the grapes on a plate, his reply would indicate whether his utilities really had
changed, or whether it was only factors relating to the position of the grapes, and the
acts required to obtain them, which changed.
It is of course true that similar problems to those mentioned above may affect this
third situation: it may not be possible to deduce a unique probability function (on
the new states of the world) and a new utility function (on the old consequences).
On the other hand, a judicious choice would circumvent this problem. It sufﬁces to
choose a situation with a particularly simple set of states of the world (for example),
and where appropriate conditions for eliciting utility functions are satisﬁed, so that the
utility and probability functions can be distinguished uniquely. The situation where the
fox is offered the grapes on a plate is such an example. Indeed, this sort of method
effectively follows in the footsteps of several well-known and useful techniques in
decision theory; moreover, although the techniques were not originally presented in
this way, they receive particularly plausible interpretations in terms of the implication
of another, simple situation. Consider Ramsey’s supposition that there is an “ethically
neutral statement” (one for which the agent is indifferent as to whether it is true or
false; Ramsey (1931)), or Savage’s axioms P2, P3 and P4: although these may be
controversial assumptions in many cases, it is surely possible to ﬁnd simple (perhaps
counterfactual) situations where they are satisﬁed, and thus where the results relying
on them may be applied.32
The ﬁnal point to be made about this style of approach concerns a ﬁnal supposition:
namely, that between the sour grapes situation and such a third situation, the beliefs or
utilities of the agent have not changed. If the comparison with the third situation is
to be useful, it is necessary to assume that the utility (or probability) is the same as
in the original situation. This supposition is, essentially, the price to pay for adopting
this strategy: given that the question of eliciting beliefs and utilities in individual sit-
uations is not resolved without recourse to other situations, suppositions regarding the
relationships between situations are required. Under the ﬁrst strategy described above,
where beliefs and utilities can be sounded independently of other situations, such sup-
positions would be empirically veriﬁable; not so now. In the example taken above, it
needs to be supposed that the fox’s preferences for the grapes does not change between
the situation where he walks away from the grapes and the situation when he is offered
them on a plate. Such relations are defendable on a case by case basis: in the example,
it seems plausible if the grapes are offered not long after the fox has decided to walk
Without wanting to enter into a long discussion, let us just note that in most informal discourse about deci-
sion, and in most applications of the theory, this is not the case: not all the aspects that could ever be in play
are effectively involved (eg. in the states of the world involved in the fox example, the result of a particular
coin toss is left unspeciﬁed).
32Ramsey’s and Savage’s assumptions are mentioned here simply as examples; as noted above, it shall not
be generally possible to employ their representation theorems as such, because their structural axioms are
unacceptable in ordinary situations. Full discussion of the appropriate conditions and techniques for belief
and utility elicitation would take us too far from the point of the paper.
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away, though perhaps too close or too far from that moment.33 It is nevertheless worth
emphasising why one should expect in general, for well-chosen pairs of situations, this
sort of supposition to be valid. The supposition basically states that there is a degree
of stability or constancy, a minimality of change between situations. However, a sup-
position of this sort is required for the study of any relationship between situations,
such as the questions of belief change, of utility change and thus of sour grapes. To
talk of change, one must be able to make sense of what it means for there to be lack
of change; this is generally the “null” state (of the relationship) from which theories of
change begin. It therefore follows that for cases where there is no reason for change, a
basic constancy must be assumed; if not, cases of change would end up being chaotic
and no theory of change would be possible. The supposition that, in general, there are
such stable cases does not count as particularly contentious, especially if the question
of change has already been invoked.
3.3 Consequences for analyses of the phenomenon
Adopting the second strategy implies a slightly different set of desiderata for a model
and analysis of sour grapes. It cannot just suppose the utilities and beliefs given, and
concern itself with the changes from one situation to the next; it must also take heed of
thefactthat, underthisapproach, thequestionofchangeispartiallyinterlinkedwiththe
question of the beliefs and utilities in a particular situation. The analysis must not only
permit the understanding of the particular change involved in sour grapes (between the
situation before and after the fox’s ﬁrst attempt at obtaining the grapes), but it should
do so in such a way that the representations of beliefs and utilities it uses is amenable
to the understanding of relationships with other situations. For example, the belief and
utility representation used should be able to partially account for actions, beliefs and
utilities of the fox in other, subsequent or counterfactual situations.
The reversibility and permanence phenomena signalled in Section 1 thus turn out
to have a particular importance under this approach to sour grapes, in so far as they
involve other situations (more or less temporally distant). Note however that the status
of these situations, in their relation to the initial situations involved in sour grapes,
differ. For a situation involved in short-term reversibility, the supposition that there
is more afﬁnity with the utility function involved when the fox walks away is rather
plausible, especially given the temporal and thematic proximity. On the other hand,
given the temporal distance between the situation where the fox walks away and the
situations involved in long-term permanence and reversibility,34 there is less reason to
suppose a common utility function between the them.
The remarks made in Section 2 regarding the performance of the analyses with
respect to these phenomena are thus crucial in the evaluation of the appropriateness of
the analyses under this approach. Recall that the ﬁrst analysis (utility change) treats
a gradual, long-term change of utility as if it were an immediate occurrence, and a
short-term apparent constancy of utility as a serious of violent changes, whereas the
33 If the example of the offer of grapes on a plate is not to your taste (the fox’s pride might prevent him
from accepting), consider the case where, just as he walks away, he spots a ladder ...
34The more complicated case of long-term reversibility shall be left aside for the purposes of this discus-
sion.
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second analysis (belief change accompanied by self-justiﬁcation), while it gives some
hold on the short-term constancy, is not very fruitful when applied to the long-term
case. As for the third account (reliability of acts), it offers two utilities, of which one –
the pure utility – naturally accounts for the relationship with immediately subsequent
situations, whereas the other utility – the agent’s situation-dependent utility – may
provide an account of the long-term change in the utility, if the situations continue
to offer the same set of acts (and thus support the same function °). This comparison
seems to favour the third analysis. This difference in performance may be interpreted in
terms of the way that the analyses deal with situation change, as follows. The ﬁrst two
analyses involve a simple utility change or belief change; there is thus no distinction
between those aspects of the phenomenon which change “for good”, and those which
are speciﬁc to the situation where the fox walks away. However, if one accepts that
one should compare different situations to determine the beliefs and utilities in each,
and that such a comparison will rest on the supposition of stability of beliefs or utilities
between certain situations, the identiﬁcation of situation-dependent factors becomes
crucial. The third analysis involves just such a situation-dependent factor: namely
°. This is why it promises to be a fruitful framework for thinking about sour grapes,
and perhaps any phenomenon where the question of change is at issue, and where this
question cannot be easily distinguished from the question of what changes.
Sour grapes poses an intricate knot of challenges, concerning the identiﬁcation of
belief and utilities, and their changes. Though often treated separately, these ques-
tions may not prove as detachable as often assumed. This is the main moral of the
paper. If one accepts that the questions have to be, to a certain extent, attacked to-
gether, then different requirements are placed on purported models. They must not
only take account of the change in the agent’s attitudes in the sour grapes story, but
equally the relationships with his attitudes and actions in other, subsequent or counter-
factual, situations. The distinction between the aspects particular to the situation and
those which transcend several situations acquires increased importance. The analysis
proposed in Section 2.3, based on the idea of a reliability measure on acts, is the second
main contribution of this paper. It gives a natural account of the idea that the agent’s
pure utility, which applies in a range of more or less contemporary situations, differs
from the situation-dependent utility, of which he talks when he states that the grapes
are undesirable. It allows a more supple understanding of the relationship between the
decision problems, the beliefs and the utilities in different situations, of what changes
and of what remains the same. That is, it offers not only an account of sour grapes, but
equally an account which promises to be amenable to the larger study of the agent’s
mental states in different situations.
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